When, in A Vision, Yeats wishes to describe a particular movement up
his byzantine Wheel of Faculties,
he looks to Blake and Shelley as his
representative men. Blake, “The
Positive Man” of Phase 16, “hates that
which opposes desire,” and his
hatred “is always close to madness . . .
There is always an element of
frenzy, and almost always a delight in a
certain glowing or shining image
of concentrated force: in the smith’s
forge; in the heart; in the human
form in its most vigorous develop-
ment.”1 Observing Blake’s wrath,
Yeats recognizes it as the fiery furnace
that provides Blake with the
energy that is his eternal delight. However, as
the Wheel turns to Shelley (“The
Daimonic Man”), this creative anger
falls away. In Yeats’s opinion,
Shelley works best when he draws his poetry
from the wellsprings of desire,
but produces only “monstrous, meaning-
less images” when he resorts to
outrage (A Vision 143). Shelley “can never
see anything that opposes him as
it really is,” because “He lacked
the Vision of Evil, could not
conceive of the world as a continual conflict,
so, though great poet he
certainly was, he was not of the greatest kind”
(143–44).
Once raised, the charge lingers: does Shelley suffer from a kind of
congenital blindness in his
dealings with evil and conflict? Does he lack a
vision of anger? In Shelley and
the Revolutionary Idea, Gerald McNeice
praises Shelley’s rebellious
courage, which he carefully separates from
“Hatred and revenge,” passions
with which “true freedom can never
coexist.”2 Donald Reiman has
reminded us that Socrates and Jesus were
Shelley’s “ideal figures,” because
they “confronted the full power of social
injustice and . . . chose
martyrdom over either flight or violent resist-
ance.”3 Challenging this standard
image of Shelley as pacifistic humanist,
Steven Jones has argued that, in
much of the poetry, “(self ) righteous
anger fueled by personal
aggression is often just below the surface” and
that “the basis of Shelley’s
satire is in violence rather than laughter.”4 By
approaching Shelley from the
vantage of satire, Jones has emphasized asubterranean side of the poet obscured
by the assertions of his idealizing
and progressivist imagination.
However, only by integrating both of these
aspects of Shelley can we
approach the complexities of his artistic and
moral imagination.5 In effect,
Shelley was often both angry and deter-
mined not to be so; and this
ambivalence can be traced through a large
portion of his work, where it
produces a particular trajectory of anger
deployed and retracted. His
vision of anger was always double, as he cast a
fierce eye on the object of his
rage and a calm one on utopian resolutions
to conflict.
Always politically minded, Shelley enacts a particularly intense version
of the Romantic struggle with
anger. For poets of the period, the trajec-
tory of events in France
demonstrated that revolutionary outrage (which
most, to greater or lesser
degrees, had imbibed) would not end cycles of
cruelty: anger had promised
revolution and revelation, yet had brought
forth reaction and terror
instead. As we have seen, negotiations with
anger became central to Romantic
conceptions of self and world and
profoundly affected Romantic
poetry in ways that I attempt to further
delineate here, in terms of the
work of Shelley. The contours of Roman-
ticism emerged also in partial
reaction to the bad eminence of eighteenth–
century satire, heightened as it
was in this period of English history
(as Habermas has shown) by the
emergent importance of public debate
to the political realm.6 Of
course, scholarly activity of the last several
decades has gone a long way
towards undoing our received story of
verse satire as a genre that
disappeared in England
after the death of
Pope. I mean to address this
question of literary history only partially,
examining the changing fortunes
of angry satire, not satire generally, in
Shelley’s imagination. Satire had
long been imagined as a weapon
for revelation, and in the
apocalyptic dawn of the French Revolution,
anger promised to undermine false
structures of power and reveal the
true nature of humanity.
Shelley’s poetry has similar promises lying
close to its heart, and he sets
about creating a species of anger not
implicated in vengeful cycles of
cruelty, a self-consuming rage that does
its work and then burns itself
out, making way for the harmonies of the
millennium. He admires anger for
its power to unmask figures of decep-
tion and vice and thus far uses
anger in a way that resembles satiric
invective in revealing the
corruption hiding beneath the mask of virtue.7
Yet angry satire, content with
naming and punishing such corruption,
remains only caustic and
pessimistic, whereas Shelley’s poetry almost
invariably contravenes its own
wrath with more conciliatory and hopeful
imaginings. For Shelley,
(satiric) anger always threatens to become another deceptive, or deceived,
mask, particularly if indulged too long or
too vehemently.
As a poet committed to the transformation of the political and social
world, however, Shelley knew that
anger was an important tool or
weapon, a needful torch for
burning in order that the work of building
utopia might begin. Thus, like
Blake, Shelley was attracted to anger
precisely because of its
renovating force. Sharing an emphatic desire to
change the world through poetry,
Blake and Shelley imagine anger as the
remover of masks and the
despoiler of illusions that constitute an un-
acceptable status quo. Masks
figure evil’s dependence on disguise, a false
state of affairs foisted on
humanity as truth. As Yeats perceived, Shelley
denies any fundamental truth to
evil, equating it always with falsity and
error. His poetry therefore
presents evil in a series of disguised figures
whose ritualized unmasking
prompts the advent of the millennium. Yet
Shelley wants to allow anger only
a momentary, functional importance in
his visions of transformation,
extinguishing it anxiously with more har-
monious emotions. He presents his
displaced outrage as a mask, or
masque, of anger.
In the spring of 1819, Shelley found himself in Florence, standing before
two statues of Marsyas, the satyr
who boasted of his musical virtuosity and
was summarily flayed alive by an
enraged Apollo. For Shelley, who
embraced Apollo as an image of
the harmonies of the creative imagin-
ation, it was a disturbing
moment, emblematic of a larger struggle with
anger. In his notebook, he
writes,
This is one of the few
abominations of the Greek religion. This is as bad as the
everlasting damnation and hacking
and hewing between them of Joshua and
Jehovah. And is it possible that
there existed in the same imagination the idea of
that tender and sublime and
poetic and life–giving Apollo and of the author
of this deed as the same person?
Having chosen ancient Greek culture as a refuge from the cruel-
ties he saw in orthodox
Christianity, Shelley is brought up short by the
specter of Marsyas suffering
under the hand of the Apollonian “author of
this deed.”9 Confronted with an
imagination capable of containing
poetic creativity and vengeful
rage within the same persona, he implicitly
wonders about the place of anger
in his own mind and work: what
does it mean for a poet to put
aside his lyre and pick up a knife or a
scourge?
Figuratively, it means to turn from song to satire, and specifically to a
tradition of invective that aims
to anatomize and punish its target.
For example, in his First Satire,
Horace remembers the satirist Lucilius, who
“from conscious Villains tore the
mask away, / And stripped them naked
to the Glare of Day.”10 Such
violent disclosure of hypocrisy remains one
of the cherished powers of angry
satire, through Jonson and Pope to
Shelley.11 In a letter to Leigh
Hunt written in 1822, Shelley declares,
“I began once a Satire upon
Satire, which I meant to be very severe, – it
was full of small knives in the
use of which practice would have soon made
me very expert.”12 Apparently,
Shelley meant to use these “knives” on
satire itself. However, a glance
at the unfinished poem reveals an image of
satiric violence directed at a
more human target: “If Satire’s [scourge]
[could wake the slumbering hounds
/ Of Conscience]”,
At the center of many of
Shelley’s narratives is a ritual of unmasking,
usually accomplished by means of
defiance and aggression: Prometheus
curses Jupiter, Shelley curses
the reviewer of Endymion, the disguised
figures in The Mask of Anarchy are
routed, Iona Taurina compels her
enemies to assume their true
shapes in Swellfoot the Tyrant. These
moments cannot be fully
assimilated to the satiric tradition, however,
because of Shelley’s own palpable
ambivalence about his anger. In fact,
scenes of unmasking are not the
unique province of satire. The romance
tradition, particularly as read
through Spenser and Milton, surely pro-
vided Shelley with another
approach to evil disguised.16 Spenser, in the
stripping of the witch Duessa in
Book i of The Faerie Queene, and Milton,
in the revelation of the toad as
Satan in Book i v of Paradise Lost,
emphasize the inevitability of
falsehood’s spectacular revelation when
confronted by truth. In The
Faerie Queene, Una (or Truth) directs the
Red Crosse Knight and Arthur to
strip Duessa (or Falsehood) naked, “and
let her fly.”17 Once they have
revealed Duessa’s deformity and ugliness,
Una proclaims, “Such is the face
of falshood, such the sight / Of fowle
Duessa, when her borrowed light /
Is laid away, and counterfesaunce
knowne” (i.8.49). Similarly, in
Paradise Lost, an angelic patrol finds Satan,
“Squat like a toad, close at the
ear of Eve,” in amphibious form that
prefigures his later
transformation: “Him thus intent Ithuriel with his
spear / Touched lightly; for no
falsehood can endure / Touch of celestial
temper, but returns / Of force to
its own likeness: up he starts / Dis-
covered and surprised . . . So
started up in his own shape the fiend.”18
These moments encapsulate the
Shelleyan project, particularly in their
rejection of vengeance. Una tells
her knights to spare Duessa’s life, and
Ithuriel touches the toad
lightly, sparing what presumably he could have
speared. The “celestial temper”
of Ithuriel’s weapon matches the angelic
forbearance of its owner,
providing a model for Shelley’s own poetic
encounters with evil.
Shelley tests the limits of this
generic structure most overtly in The
Mask of Anarchy, inspired by the
poet’s openly satiric outrage over the
Peterloo Massacre and by his
attempts to transcend that outrage by way of
the masque. A good deal of
critical ink has been devoted to the strange
intersection of satire and masque
found in The Mask of Anarchy. Most
notably, Stuart Curran, Lisa
Vargo, and Steven Jones have all discussed its
various maskings and unmaskings,
and all three critics seem quite pre-
pared to read The Mask of Anarchy
as following the generic trajectory I
have described: from satiric
anger and its unmasking imperative to
millennial, masque-like hope as
the end of satire.37 At a relatively high
level, The Mask of Anarchy does
conform to this structure. The masked,
allegorical figures of evil are
dispersed by a spirit of freedom and the voice
of the earth, thus restoring
“Hope” (line 128). However, because the
“indignant earth” gets the last
word – and there repeats her first, most
militant advice – we may feel
that anger remains dominant at the poem’s
conclusion. Shelley is explicitly
concerned here with breaking cycles of
violence and revenge, yet he is
unwilling to relinquish the outrage that he
continually defers. He claims to
have felt a “torrent of indignation” in
response to Peterloo, but he
begins The Mask of Anarchy not as a raging
poet, but as a dreaming one. The
poem opens on a cinematic vision that
combines Biblical iconography and
English politics with the logic of
nightmare. As a poetic spectacle
or masque of evil (Shelley calls it a
“ghastly masquerade” in line 27),
the first twenty-five stanzas of the poem
are grim and disturbing, but
their tone can hardly be called angry. As
Morton Paley puts it, the speaker
“does not seem to comprehend
the meaning of what he relates:
extraordinary events are recounted
in a flat, quotidian tone, much as
in Blake’s ‘The Mental Traveller’”
(“Apocapolitics,” 94).
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